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Abstract
Economic crises generally lead to reductions in foreign aid. However, the widely held
view that budgetary constraints caused by economic crises reduce aid is inaccurate
because donor government outlays actually tend to increase. We develop an argu-
ment that aid cuts occur because voters place a lower priority on aid during economic
downturns and politicians respond by cutting aid. Using data from Eurobarometer,
we demonstrate that economic downturns lead to reduced public support for help-
ing the poor abroad. These findings are robust across a large number of alternative
specifications. Our findings have implications for how advocates may prevent aid
reductions during economic recessions.
Keywords: foreign aid; economic crises; public opinion; EU
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1 Introduction
Economic crises in rich and developed countries, such as the 2007/2008 financial crisis
or the Eurozone crisis that began in 2009, are unequivocally disconcerting to citizens.
However, such crises may cause even graver, compounded harm to people in countries
that depend on richer countries’ foreign aid.1 Such concerns were particularly evident
after the most recent financial crisis. Aid supporters, international organizations, and
non-governmental organizations repeatedly implored donor governments not to cut back
on their aid commitments. The United Nations Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, echoed
these sentiments, stating “[T]o the traditional donors, I say: do not let this economic
crisis, do not let short-term austerity deflect you from your long-term commitment to the
world’s poorest people [...] Cutting aid will not balance your budgets. But it will hurt
the poor - the most vulnerable of the human family.” The CEO of World Vision Australia,
a large development NGO, echoed these calls after Australia’s ruling coalition proposed
cuts in foreign aid. Similarly, Oxfam America ridiculed proposals to cut aid in order to
balance the budget in the United States.2 However, most donors did not heed such calls
to stay steady on foreign aid.3 The broader scholarly evidence shows that such aid cuts by
donors are hardly an aberration (Arellano, Bulı´rˇ, Lane & Lipschitz 2009, Frot 2009, Dang,
Knack & Rogers 2013, Roodman 2008).
What explains such decisions by donor governments? While many studies explore
1 For these concerns, see for example David Leonhardt, “Lessons from a crisis: when trust vanishes,
worry,” New York Times, URL: http://nyti.ms/1rDtMMi, September 30, 2008; Jon Cohen and Jennifer
Agiesta, “Lots of fear remains over economy, job losses, poll finds,” The Washington Post, URL: http:
//wapo.st/1uMjQdC, September 15, 2009; and Larry Elliot, “Eurozone austerity hits world’s poor as
Europe’s aid falls by e700m,” The Guardian, URL: http://bit.ly/1vRwvmI, June 24, 2012.
2 For all the quotes, see in order: Ban Ki-moon, “Aid Is Not Charity, Says Secretary-General, but Smart
Investment in Security, Prosperity, an Engine of Growth that Creates Jobs, Expands Markets,” URL:
http://bit.ly/1voqef4, November 30, 2011; Tim Costello, “Balancing the books on the backs of
the poor,” Australian Broadcasting Company, URL: http://ab.co/1ylRxZo, September 6, 2013; Oxfam,
“Really, THIS is your plan to balance the budget?,” URL: http://bit.ly/1ryUnEs, March 27, 2012.
3 OECD, “Development: Aid to developing countries falls because of global recession,” OECD News-
room, April 4, 2012.
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the connection between economic crises and aid, few go beyond establishing the em-
pirical relationship. One tempting answer may be that economic crises produce bud-
getary constraints, and therefore governments reduce aid commitments. While perhaps
initially plausible, this answer cannot provide a full explanation. If true, we should ex-
pect that in times of economic duress, donor governments’ budgets in general should
be smaller than they were before the crises. A recent flurry of bailouts of financial in-
stitutions patently belies this. More systematically, an extensive literature in economics
shows that governments tend to increase, not decrease, spending during the initial stages
of an economic crisis (e.g. Gali 1994, Lane 2003, Perotti 2005, Fata´s & Mihov 2009, Lee
& Sung 2007, Auerbach 2009, E´gert 2014). As its fundamental assumption does not ex-
hibit much merit, this seemingly plausible answer to why foreign aid commitments drop
during economic crises cannot hold much water.
We develop an argument that puts its explanatory locus on the domestic politics
within donor countries. As the major aid donors are democracies, we expect politicians
that make decisions on foreign aid in such countries to be responsive to their citizens’
wishes in general (Powell Jr. 2000, Soroka & Wlezien 2010, Canes-Wrone 2015). We ar-
gue that voters shift their attitudes toward aid during economic crises and that election-
minded politicians help turn these attitudes into policy. However, why would public
support for foreign aid change in response to economic crises? The answer to this is not
immediately clear. We know that foreign aid accounts for only a tiny portion of donors’
budgets, that it brings tangible benefits (e.g. export promotion), and that it helps achieve
a variety of important foreign policy goals, including promoting national security. While
politicians and scholars know this, voters tend to see foreign aid as a charity that is costly
but without many tangible benefits. As we argue below, these biases and voters’ personal
beliefs on the state of the economymake foreign aid an easy target for budget cuts during
economic crises.
Relying on a variety of variables from several years of the Eurobarometer, we first
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show that public support for foreign aid and development efforts strongly decreases
when the respondent’s personal economic fortunes worsen. This result holds across var-
ious measures and alternative specifications. Further, we look for additional evidence
to bolster our argument. First, we find that our results hold if we consider economic
crises as only the sources of personal economic misfortune. Second, we show that elite
preferences do not appear to influence public opinion. We leverage the case of Britain,
in which politicians quite uniformly argued adamantly against cutting aid and find that
this unified stance does not lead to significantly weaker results in the United Kingdom.
This article makes several contributions to the literature on foreign aid. First, this
study introduces a framework that builds on insights from separate bodies of literature
on foreign aid allocations, public opinion, retrospective voting, and macroeconomics by
showing how financial crises influence politicians’ aid decisions through voters’ beliefs.
While some scholars and journalists have observed that aid cuts during economic reces-
sions may have something to do with changes in public support (e.g. Dang, Knack &
Rogers 2013), the current article lays out a theoretical argument that links public opin-
ion, decision-making, and foreign aid, allowing us to actually derive and test a precise
hypothesis. Second, our findings complement the growing body of research that inves-
tigates the determinants of individual preferences for foreign aid. While previous stud-
ies tend to focus on socio-demographic, political, material, and attitudinal factors that
change little over time (Noe¨l & The´rien 2002, Chong & Gradstein 2008, Van Heerde &
Hudson 2010, Paxton & Knack 2012, Milner & Tingley 2013, Henson & Lindstrom 2013,
Bauhr, Charron & Nasiritousi 2013), our work points to an important source of over-time
changes in aid support. The focus on changes in one’s personal fortunes introduces a
powerful over-time variation in support of foreign aid. Furthermore, although previous
research has examined the relationship between individual income levels and support
for foreign aid (e.g. Chong & Gradstein 2008), this study more directly links changes in
individuals’ economic circumstances to their support for aid. Third, the results provide
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guidance for those who wish to uphold foreign aid outlays. Importantly, our argument
implies that while giving warnings such as those made by the United Nations Secretary-
General can be effective, they need to bewell-targeted at voters within donors. We believe
that the scant research on how governments might manipulate public opinion on foreign
aid should received more attention (Van der Veen 2011).
In the next section, we review the literature on how foreign aid fares during economic
crises. Subsequently, we draw on findings from several strands of literature and construct
our argument connecting public opinion, politicians, and foreign aid. Using data from
several waves of Eurobarometer surveys, we then test our argument about perceived
economic downturns and individual support for aid. Next, we carry out two additional
ways to check our results. We then conclude with a discussion of the implications of our
study for how to prevent donor countries from cutting aid commitments.
2 Do Financial Crises Reduce Aid?
An extant literature on foreign aid identifies a number of economic and political deter-
minants of aid (see summarily Alesina & Dollar 2000, Neumayer 2003). Among these,
economic crises in donor countries are found to be a powerful predictor of foreign aid.4
For example, Frot (2009) compares the aid budgets of donors who did and did not expe-
rience a financial crisis and reports that foreign aid budgets fell following financial crises
in six donor countries since 1970. The magnitudes of these drops are quite drastic: Fin-
land cut its aid by more than 50 percent immediately after its 1991 financial crisis. Using
a vector autoregression model, Frot (2009) also examines the effect of changes in GDP,
government budget deficits, and unemployment on aid budgets for donor countries. He
4 See Berthe´lemy& Tichit (2004), Tingley (2010), Mendoza, Jones &Vergara (2009), Frot (2009), Roodman
(2008), Dang, Knack & Rogers (2013), Pallage & Robe (2001), Dabla-Norris, Minoiu & Zanna (2015),
and Reinsberg (2015). In a noteworthy departure, Fuchs, Dreher & Nunnenkamp (2014) report that
financial crises are not robustly related to donors’ total aid budgets.
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finds that a negative shock to GDP growth significantly reduces aid disbursements, and
that the effects of such a shock are both long-lasting and take time to fully occur.
Others consider bilateral aid flows and find smaller aid flows when the donor is in
an economic recession. Controlling for time-varying variables such as income, Dang,
Knack & Rogers (2013) find that banking crises are a strong predictor of decreased aid
disbursements. Compared to non-crisis countries, aid from crisis-affected countries falls
by at least 28%. Furthermore, while the negative effects of the crisis begin almost immedi-
ately, aid flows decrease for at least ten years after the crisis’s onset. Moreover, Mendoza,
Jones & Vergara (2009) show that when stock market uncertainty (which they argue is a
good proxy for financial volatility and economic uncertainty) increases, the United States
reduces its aid. They also find that worsening economic conditions, represented by an in-
crease in the misery index, decrease U.S. bilateral aid. Similarly, Dabla-Norris, Minoiu &
Zanna (2015) find that donors significantly reduce their aid disbursements during periods
of severe economic stress, defined as years when deviations from the GDP growth trend
fall into the bottom quartile of the donor-specific distribution. These empirical findings
justify the concerns of aid practitioners discussed earlier.
Despite these strong empirical findings, scholars have devoted little effort to studying
the responsible underlying mechanism. Perhaps this is because there is a seemingly ob-
vious explanation: economic downturns tighten government budgets, and thus lead to
cutting outlays across the board, including those for foreign aid. This economic explana-
tion seems to lie at the heart of many statements made by policy makers and diplomats.
For example, in response to two successive falls in total aid provided by major donor
countries, OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurrı´a said, “It is worrying that budgetary
duress in our member countries has led to a second successive fall in total aid.”5
Not only is this thinking intuitive, but it also naturally follows from existing theories
5 OECD, “Development: Aid to developing countries falls because of global recession,” OECD News-
room, April 4, 2012.
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of foreign aid. For example, Dudley & Montmarquette (1976) treat foreign aid as one
consumable good among others and model donors’ aid decisions as a budget allocation
problem. It follows that if the overall budget goes down, the budget for foreign aid as
well as other goods will decline. A recent model of foreign aid allocations proposed
by Bueno de Mesquita & Smith (2009), which has attracted attention in political science,
predicts the same pattern. In it, the level of the donor’s available budget is one of the key
determinants of foreign aid: as the budget contracts, so do aid outlays.
While initially plausible, this explanation is not satisfying as its primary assumption
is at odds with empirical observations. If a budget contraction were to explain budget
cuts, we should expect that in times of economic crisis or slowdown, donor governments’
budgets in general should be smaller than they were before the crisis. This implication is,
in fact, inconsistent with prevailing empirical macroeconomic evidence. The consensus
finding is that government spending tends to either run counter to or be unresponsive
to business cycles in developed countries (e.g. Gali 1994, Lane 2003, Perotti 2005, Fata´s
& Mihov 2009, Lee & Sung 2007, E´gert 2014).6 This counter-cyclical policy reflects auto-
matic stabilizers like health spending, unemployment safety net expansion, and the re-
alization of contingency funds, which are ostensibly meant to stimulate economic recov-
ery. Moreover, the discretionary part of spending also tends to be a-cyclical or counter-
cyclical, i.e., it increases or is unresponsive during recessions (e.g. Auerbach 2009, Fata´s &
Mihov 2009). These findings render a major premise of the implicit economic explanation
for the nexus between crises and aid cuts off the mark.
Given that the existing theories of foreign aid and its economic explanatory roots can-
not fully address this well established empirical pattern, we turn to domestic politics
within donors to develop an argument that can account for these patterns. In particu-
lar, we focus on voters and their attitudes toward foreign aid and helping the poor in
6 In contrast, studies find mixed evidence for the behavior of fiscal policy in developing countries (e.g.
Gavin & Perotti 1997, Talvi & Vegh 2005, Alesina, Campante & Tabellini 2008).
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developing countries.
3 Public Opinion and Foreign Aid during Financial Crises
The policy priorities of responsive politicians often reflect constituents’ opinions (see
summarily Canes-Wrone 2015). Whereas foreign policy scholars used to deny the ap-
plicability of this connection to foreign policy, it is now widely accepted (Aldrich, Gelpi,
Feaver, Reifler & Sharp 2006, Baum & Potter 2008). Recent work has begun examin-
ing more nuanced arguments about how and when public opinion affects foreign policy
(Baum 2012, Dukhong 2013, Whang 2011). While the literature on foreign aid and public
opinion has been less abundant compared to other foreign policy instruments such as
the use of force or trade policy, existing studies have not only examined the various de-
terminants of voters’ preferences for foreign aid, but also demonstrated when and how
voters’ opinions influence politicians’ aid decisions.7 There are several channels through
which public opinion can influence aid policies, but we focus on the most obvious for
the general case of democratic donor countries, namely the electoral connection (Aldrich
et al. 2006).
We assume that the primary driver of politicians’ policy choices in any democracy is
the desire to get reelected (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson & Morrow 2005). Moti-
vated by incentives to get reelected, politicians are perceptive about and at the same time
wary of changes in their constituents’ attitudes and opinions. This is particularly the case
during economic recessions, as such macroeconomic changes are likely to have serious
consequences on voters’ financial situations. While actual policies do not perfectly match
constituents’ opinions (i.e. policy congruence), the literature agrees that policy tends to
7 On the research on determinants of attitudes toward aid, see Noe¨l & The´rien (2002), Chong & Grad-
stein (2008), Van Heerde & Hudson (2010), Paxton & Knack (2012), Milner & Tingley (2013), Henson
& Lindstrom (2013), and Baker (2015). On the connection between public opinion and aid outcomes,
see Milner (2006), Chong & Gradstein (2008), Milner & Tingley (2010), Tingley (2010), Eisensee &
Stro¨mberg (2007), Van Belle, Rioux & Potter (2004), Nielsen (2013), and Heinrich (2013).
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be responsive: changes tend to follow opinion changes (Canes-Wrone 2015).8
We argue that aid cuts occur during economic crises because politicians respond to
changes in public demand to reduce aid. Not only does the scholarly literature leads us
to propose this connection, but several prominent recent anecdotes also bolster this view.
Politicians in aid donors often cite voters’ opinion to push for aid cuts. For example, U.S.
Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, speaking after being named Chairman of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee in 2011, said that in the prior election “the voters made it clear
that if we don’t take the correct approach to policy by keeping our economy foremost in
our decisions, they’re going to ship us all out. Republicans [her party] got the message
and are committed to making ‘the people’s House’ work for the people again. [...] I have
identified and will propose a number of cuts to the State Department and Foreign Aid
budgets.”9 In the United Kingdom, speaking about international aid on his trip to India,
MP Patrick Mercer said, “I believe most people are tolerant of spending money overseas
until it comes to some of the more telling elements of that spending. For instance, many
in my constituency would take serious exception to millions of pounds being spent on
foreign schools when our own secondary schools are tumbling down around our kids’
ears.”10 In both examples, politicians invoke the worsening of the economic situation for
voters as a reason for cuts in foreign aid.
While politicians may have electoral incentives to address changes in voters’ support
for aid, the existing scholarly body of work on foreign aid does not immediately lead
us to expect drastic changes in public support for foreign aid during economic crises.
8 A rich literature in comparative politics investigates variation in democracies and identifies the con-
ditions under which politicians have strong incentives to address constituents’ demands. For ex-
ample, one body of the literature investigates how details in donors’ electoral rules may mediate
the effects of public opinion on actual policies (e.g. Crisp, Escobar-Lemmon, Jones, Jones & Taylor-
Robinson 2004, Heitshusen, Young &Wood 2005, Martin 2010, Mayhew 1974).
9 Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, “Ros-Lehtinen to Chair House Foreign Affairs Committee in Next Congress,”
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, http://1.usa.gov/1Kd1saZ, December 8, 2010.
10 Yorkshire Post, “Patrick Mercer: Foreign aid depends on military still being able to do their job as cuts
bite,” http://bit.ly/1A5b5VU, February 23, 2013.
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Below, we develop our argument by examiningwell-known biases and perceptions about
aid and then derive a hypothesis about how economic crises lead to a decline in voters’
support for foreign aid.
FINANCIAL CRISES, VOTERS’ BELIEFS AND SUPPORT FOR AID
We assume that votersmake forward-looking, rational calculationswhen decidingwhether
to support a certain foreign aid policy. That is, we assume that individuals have be-
liefs and preferences, which in turn determine their attitudes toward particular poli-
cies. Although voters know little about foreign aid policies, voters still hold beliefs
(Holsti 1992, Aldrich et al. 2006) which may be far from reality. We argue that it is these
differences (i.e., biases) that make aid an easy and politically valuable target for budget
cuts during financial crises. By carefully examining what citizens know and believe, we
are able to explain why voters want to provide less support for foreign aid. In this section,
we develop what voters’ beliefs may look like and how these deviate from how scholars
think about aid and foreign policies. Specifically, we examine three types of beliefs that
are relevant to voters’ attitudes toward foreign aid: the tangible benefits from providing
foreign aid, how much foreign aid costs, and how many resources are available to the
government from which aid is drawn.
We first examine voters’ beliefs about the purpose of foreign aid policies. The exist-
ing scholarly literature suggests foreign aid provides a number of benefits to the donor
public. Governments use aid as a foreign policy instrument to influence other states
(Bueno de Mesquita & Smith 2007), boost donor exports (Bearce, Finkel, Pe´rez-Lin˜a´n,
Rodrı´guez-Zepeda & Surzhko-Harned 2013, Hu¨hne, Meyer & Nunnenkamp 2014), im-
prove foreigners’ images of one’s country (Goldsmith, Horiuchi & Wood 2014), and help
combat terrorism and drugs (nowadays) (Azam & Delacroix 2006, Bapat 2011, Boutton
& Carter 2013, Bartilow & Eom 2009). While such evidence is strong, some studies on
the allocation of aid suggest that more selfless motives also drive governments’ deci-
11
sions on foreign aid, such as concerns for global justice and goals of poverty reduction
(Lumsdaine 1993, Hoeffler & Outram 2011, Dietrich 2013, Heinrich 2013).
In general, voters mirror this by not only appreciating the tangible policy concessions
that aid may bring (such as international cooperation and trade benefits), but also by en-
joying knowing that their government helps the poor elsewhere. While survey evidence
appears to support this heterogeneity of preferences, the appreciation of benefits by vot-
ers is actually much smaller in importance compared to the norms of helping the poor
elsewhere. For example, an Australian survey showed that about 70% of people listed
humanitarian motivations as the main reason Australia should provide aid, while the
remainder gave self-interested reasons (Australian Government, Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade 2005, Figure 15). Lumsdaine (1993) provides plentiful broader survey
results to this end. In a recent survey experiment, Heinrich & Kobayashi (2014) report
evidence that appreciation of obtained tangible concessions via foreign aid is very small
compared to other considerations. Taken together, the prevailing survey evidence sug-
gests that from voters’ perspective, foreign aid is largely a selfless, charitable policy and
much less a tool to obtain sought-after policy concessions. Therefore, when a crisis oc-
curs, voters can more easily call for a cut in aid as not many tangible benefits are lost in
their view.
Voters must also have some beliefs about the extent of current foreign policy practices
to decide whether to continue supporting them. In fact, it is well-known that the gen-
eral public is quite ignorant about the extent of foreign aid policies. For instance, a 2010
survey reports that the median guess by U.S. survey respondents is that 25% of the U.S.
budget goes to foreign aid. Similarly, 26% of British citizens believed U.K. foreign aid
outlays ranked in the top three spending items, and more respondents ranked it higher
than outlays for pensions.11 Although cutting back on the aid budget cannot undo bud-
11 For U.S. and U.K. surveys, see WorldPublicOpinion.org, “American Public Opinion on Foreign Aid,”
URL:http://bit.ly/1Fwu9c8, November 30, 2010, and Ipsos MORI (2013, Question 17). Further, see
Ezra Klein, “The budget myth that just wont die: Americans still think 28 percent of the budget goes
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getary problems stemming from a financial crisis, voters’ dramatic overstatement of the
size of existing aid (together with the belief that aid is mostly charity) ought to lead them
to believe that it might contribute.
Last, foreign aid is costly and consumes resources that otherwise could be used for
other policies. When deciding whether to support aid policies, voters must also consider
how much resources are available to the government to spend on all policies, including
foreign aid. Again, voters generally do not have a good idea of how large their govern-
ment’s budget is or how the economy is actually faring (Stevenson & Duch 2013), which
in turn influences the budget. Thus, it is important to consider the sources of voters’ be-
liefs about howmuch resources are expected to be available to spend on various policies.
Drawing on the literature on retrospective voting (Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier 2000, Duch &
Stevenson 2008), we argue that voters form beliefs based on their evaluations of past per-
sonal circumstances. In particular, in forming their beliefs about available resources and
the state of the economy, voters rely on their personal financial situations to determine
their support for foreign aid. Therefore, recent personal downturns–such as job loss by
oneself or one’s family member, or negative shocks to investments–would lead a voter to
believe that the economy is faring badly.
Taken together, our argument arrives at how these beliefs lead to waning support for
foreign aid during an economic crisis. Whereas cutting foreign aid commitments can-
not be an integral part of the response to an economic crisis, voters’ biased beliefs lead
them to believe that it might be or could at least contribute. Once we consider people’s
beliefs about foreign aid, we can derive a link between financial crises and support for
foreign aid. As people believe that aid is largely charitable, downplay or are ignorant of
its tangible benefits, and dramatically overestimate its size, we expect voters to provide
less support for foreign aid programs when experiencing personal economic distress. Be-
low, we test this hypothesis linking individual support for foreign aid and development
to foreign aid,” The Washington Post, URL:http://wapo.st/1Fwuxr3, November 8, 2013.
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policy to ones’ personal economic situation using recent survey data from the European
Union.
4 Personal fortunes and support for aid
In our analysis, we link individuals’ changes in their personal financial situation to ex-
pressed support for foreign aid and development-related policies. We find survey data
that asked questions related to the respondent’s personal financial situation and about
foreign aid in various waves of the widely used Eurobarometer.12 For our main anal-
yses, we employ data from EB79.4 (2013), EB77.4 (2012), EB76.1 (2011), EB73.5 (2010),
and EB71.2 (2009). Although there is a significant overlap across these waves, some of
the questions of interest to us are omitted or worded differently. Thus, depending on the
availability and compatibility of questions, we pool different waves for separate analyses.
For each analysis, we introduce the subset of survey waves that we used.
4.1 VARIABLES
We are interested in explaining public support for helping the poor abroad. To this end,
we focus on three questions asked in several Eurobarometer waves that let us examine
our hypothesis. Details about the exact wording and source for each variable are pre-
sented in the web appendix.
The first question asks the respondent whether he or she thinks it is important to help
the poor in the developingworld. The possible answers to this question include “very im-
portant,” “fairly important,” “not very important,” and “not at all important.” Based on
the respondents’ answers, we construct the Is aid important? variable. The Keep promise?
12 Our analyses rely on 27 countries: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom, Austria, Sweden, Finland, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Ro-
mania.
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question concerns whether the respondent thinks that the European Union should stick
to previously made promises to increase development aid even though there has been a
financial crisis. The available options are to increase aid beyond the initial promise, to
increase in line with the promise, to not increase, and to reduce aid. Our third question
asks the respondent about his/her willingness to make personal economic sacrifices to
finance development. The text of this Pay more? question is “Would you be prepared to
pay more for groceries or other products from developing countries to support people
living in these countries (for instance for fair trade products)?” The respondent’s choices
are to be willing to pay more than 10% more, 6-10% more, up to 5% more, and pay no
more. Based on these questions, we construct three ordinal dependent variables, all with
four levels.
While these three variables are all reflective of respondents’ attitudes toward help-
ing the poor abroad, they differ in some important and substantively illuminating as-
pects. First, the Is aid important? variable is different from the other two in that it is
about the principle of helping the poor, but does not invoke the idea of payments. It
taps directly into the normative dimension of foreign aid (Singer 2010). Second, while
both Keep promise? and Pay more? suggest financial costs from helping the poor, the Keep
promise? question is less personal, asking about respondents’ opinions on the EU’s aid
but not whether they are willing to spend more. From the respondent’s point of view,
his/her country pays only a fraction of the costs of EU aid. Therefore, to a large degree,
this question involves a consideration of whether to spend others’ money. In contrast,
the Pay more? question clearly prompts the respondent to ponder the personal monetary
consequences of helping the poor abroad.
Tomeasure the respondent’s evaluation of changes in his/her personal financial situa-
tion, we rely on two questions from the Eurobarometer. The first question asks how one’s
“financial situation” in the Household changed compared to five years ago, with respon-
dents choosing among “got worse,” “improved,” “stayed about the same”, and “don’t
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know.” We construct four indicator variables that each take a value of one when the re-
spondent provides each of these answers, and a zero otherwise. We treat the “stayed
about the same” variable as a reference category and exclude it from our models. While
we prefer this question about one’s household situation because of its explicit empha-
sis on the financial aspect, we also consider another question about one’s Job situation.
While closely linked to the financial situation, its focus is a bit narrower. For example,
one can lose a job while still being financially sound because of savings, investments, or a
high-income spouse. The possible answers are the same as before, and “stayed about the
same” is again our reference category. We use answers to these two questions about one’s
financial household situation (Household) and one’s Job situation as primary predictors of
one’s support for foreign aid and development.
We also include a set of control variables related to the basic demographic charac-
teristics of the respondents in our statistical models. First, we control for the age of re-
spondents by creating six dummy variables for six age groups (i.e. 18-24, 25-34, 35-44,
45-54, 55-64, and 65+). In our model, the 18-24 age group is treated as a reference cate-
gory. Second, we also control for the gender of the respondent by including a variable
taking a value of one for female, and zero otherwise. Third, we construct a series of in-
dicator variables for one’s self-reported social rank in society (“bottom of bottom”, “top
of bottom”, “middle”, “bottom of top”, “top of top”, “don’t know/ refused”) with the
“bottom of bottom group as a reference category. Fourth, we control for the geography
of where the respondent lives using four dummy variables (“large town”, “rural area/
village”, “small/ middle sized town”, and “dont know”), with don’t-know serving as
the reference category. Finally, a series of variables indicating the type of job that the re-
spondent holds is constructed (“business owner”, “employed position”, “management”,
“professional”, “retiree/unable to work”, “student”, “unemployed”, and “other”), with
the “business owner” category excluded as a reference group. Information on these vari-
ables is available for all of our survey waves. If there is a missing value, we code such a
16
response as don’t-know for all control variables. For details on the question wording and
descriptive statistics, please see the appendix.
4.2 STATISTICAL INFERENCE
Our dependent variables are the four levels of support for foreign aid and international
development. Since each of these variables is ordinal in nature, we use ordered probit
models in which we include our variables capturing the respondents’ personal finan-
cial situations, random intercepts by country, and dichotomous variables to capture het-
erogeneity by survey waves. All models are estimated via Markov Chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) methods.
Missing data (i.e., non-responses and refused answers) is always an issue with sur-
vey data. When a respondent did not or refused to answer for one of our independent
variables, we simply code this as a distinct, separate survey response and include it as a
covariate in the model. However, we do not do so for missing values on the dependent
variables. We deal with this issue by making use of an elegant feature from the Bayesian
approach to inference and its model estimation via MCMC. During the iterative sam-
pling from the posterior distribution, a missing value for the dependent variable can be
automatically and naturally imputed from the marginal likelihood of that missing obser-
vation (Jackman 2000, Gelman, Carlin, Stern & Rubin 2014). This simplifies the analysis,
as no multiple imputations across the entire data sets need to be carried out. Therefore,
all our analyses that we report below are marginalized over the missing values on our
dependent variables.13
13 Using Hadfield’s (2010) MCMCglmm package provided us with fast and efficient estimation of the
model parameters. We rely on proper, but largely uninformative prior distributions for the param-
eters of the model. For each model, we run two chains of 120,000 MCMC iterations, discarding the
first 20,000, and then kept every 4th draw. To look for signs of non-convergence, we calculate the Gel-
man/Rubin/Brooks scale reduction factors (Rˆ) for each parameter in each model. Without exception,
they are in the range recommended by Gelman et al. (2014). Details on the convergence diagnostics
are available from the authors.
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4.3 RESULTS
[TABLE 1 HERE]
Table 1 presents the summaries of the posterior distribution for the parameters for
our six main models. The models rely on data from different years. For the analysis of
the Is aid important? and Keep promise? questions, we use EB79.4 (2013), EB77.4 (2012),
EB73.5 (2010), and EB71.2 (2009) as data sources. When studying whether respondents
are willing to Pay more?, we drop EB73.5 (2010) and EB71.2 (2009) as the question was not
asked.
Foremost, all coefficient estimates for “got worse” are robustly and sizably negative,
regardless of howwemeasure the personal financial situation andwhich dependent vari-
able we use. The 95% central credible intervals also do not cross zero. That is, compared
to an unchanging past (“stayed the same” as a reference category), when the household fi-
nancial or job situation “got worse,” support for helping the poor abroad drops. Further-
more, the mirror results hold: when personal fortunes “improved,” support increases.
Taken together, these results provide clear support for our main hypothesis.
Next, we also display substantive effects by comparing predicted probabilities for the
different levels of support across the survey questions. We believe that this is important
as gleaning the magnitude of the negative effects in Table 1 is difficult in non-linear mod-
els, particularly when they include cut-points such as the ordered probit we use (King,
Tomz & Wittenberg 2000). Specifically, for each level of each question, we simulate the
predicted probabilities that a voter chooses a given level of support when the personal
financial situation “improved” and also when it “got worse.”14
14 We calculate these predictions by marginalizing out the other covariates (age, gender, etc.) (Gelman &
Pardoe 2007, Hanmer & Ozan Kalkan 2013). For each MCMC draw, we randomly draw 1,000 observa-
tions from our data set, use these observations’ covariates and country memberships, and calculate the
predicted probabilities of support for each level of the outcome twice: once under the assumption that
the personal financial household situation “got worse”, and once under the assumption that it “im-
proved.” We then take the median across each of the 1,000 cases. This gives the posterior distribution
of predicted probabilities of each level of the outcome under two levels of retrospective evaluation,
marginalized over all other used covariates.
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[FIGURE 1 HERE]
Figure 1 gives the results for the simulated probabilities of support. In the first panel,
we plot the possible levels of support from “not at all important” to “very important”
on the x-axis, and the summary of the posterior distribution for the predicted probabil-
ities for each respective level on the y-axis. The black dots represent the median of the
posterior distribution of the predicted probability when the personal financial situation
“improved”; the gray dots do the same for the case when the situation “got worse.” The
vertical lines depict the respective 95% central credible intervals.
The lowest level of support in the first panel (i.e., those that say that aid is “not at all
important”) barely changes, as the difference between the gray and black dots is not dis-
cernible. The second lowest support level (aid is “not very important”) increases slightly
when the financial situation “got worse.” The third level of support (aid is “fairly im-
portant”) is the most prominent answer, and it increases somewhat when the situation
turns sour. Last, the highest level of support (aid is “very important”) is the only one that
decreases when the situation becomes worse.
Together, these results provide insights beyond what is readily discernible from the
coefficients in Table 1. Household economic crises decrease individuals’ support for for-
eign aid, but the impact is not uniform across support levels. The biggest movement
occurs at the higher levels of support for helping the poor. Those with the highest level
of support (aid is “very important”) endorse the idea of helping less strongly or actu-
ally deem it to be just “fairly important” when the household situation “got worse.” This
suggests that although personal economic crises do little to change the generally positive
attitude toward the principle of foreign aid, the most enthusiast support wanes.
We now turn to the middle panel, where we present the simulated results pertaining
to the question of whether the EU should keep its previous promise to increase aid. Pro-
posals to either reduce or not increase aid become more popular as the evaluation of the
financial household situation worsens. In contrast, support for keeping the promise and
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increasing EU aid decreases during personal economic crises. Therefore, recent down-
turns in one’s household finances leads one to favor not increasing aid.
Last, we turn to the question about respondents’ willingness to pay more for every-
day goods in the right panel. The results are the opposite of what we find for the Is aid
important? variable. When household finances get worse, the unwillingness to pay any-
thing more is the only response to increase, and all responses that entail personal costs
decrease.
In sum, we find strong support for our hypothesis that personal economicmisfortunes
lead to less support for helping the poor abroad, and the finding is robust across our three
measures and across twomeasures of retrospective financial circumstances. Additionally,
an interesting pattern emerges beyond what we originally hypothesized. According to
our results, the changes for the Is aid important? variable due to personal economic crises
occur at the highest levels of support. That is, when the question is about the importance
of assistance with no mention of its costliness, the public appears to hold on to the basic
principle that assistance is “important.”When the costliness of such assistance is implied,
changes in support are more dramatic. The question on whether the EU ought to keep
its promise, the next more costly question, sees changes from support for keeping and
increasing promises to an unwillingness to support increases in aid and a willingness
to actually reduce aid. Last, for the highest level of implied costliness, changes occur
at the lowest level of support, with the least favorable option actually gaining the most
support. These patterns of changes suggest that foreign aid becomes less supported as
implied costliness increases. This corroborates a finding from a recent survey experiment
which shows that respondents are less supportive of aid as its costs increase (Heinrich
& Kobayashi 2014) and has important implications for how foreign aid cuts should be
managed, which we come back to in the conclusion.
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5 Crisis, job loss, and support for aid
Our general theoretical argument is about people using their own experiences to learn
about the national economy. That is, our theoretical variable is agnostic about the sources
of individual fortunes. However, individual financial misfortunes can be caused by
events other than economic crises. Following suggestions by reviewers, we also prod
whether our results hold when the economic crisis is the specific reason for one’s per-
sonal financial misfortunes.
We identified two Eurobarometer waves which asked questions about foreign aid as
well as about individual experiences from the crisis. In EB71.2 (2009), respondents were
asked whether they lost their jobs “as a result of the economic crisis.” In EB76.1 (2011),
the question was to state whether the respondent lost the job “as a direct consequence of
the crisis,” “not as a direct consequence of the crisis,” or whether the respondent had not
experienced job loss at all.15 As these questions are not quite the same, we analyze the
survey waves separately. We have the Is aid important? and Keep promise? questions for
both waves, and Pay more? for the 2011 survey. The rest of the model specifications are as
before (except for the indicators for the years).
Before examining the results of this analysis, we want to highlight that there is rea-
son to be cautious a priori. People, on average, are not great economists (Caplan 2011)
so that attributing one’s job loss to the crisis might be an issue. It is particularly prob-
lematic for the 2009 survey question, which does not allow for a don’t-know/refused-
to-answer response. Even for people who routinely think about economics, it should be
hard to determine whether one’s job was lost “as a result of the economic crisis.”16 Fur-
15 For simplicity, we collapsed the response that no job loss occurred and that one happened, but that it
was unrelated to the crisis into one response, which serves as the reference category.
16 We see some evidence in the raw data that the 2009 survey question about crisis-induced job loss
might be of questionable quality. Roughly 10% of the respondents said “yes” – that they lost their
jobs “as a result of the economic crisis.” However, in 2009 only four countries in our sample (Spain,
Estonia, Slovak Republic, and Ireland) had unemployment rates greater than 10% (by ILO as well as by
national estimates), of which 10–40% are long-term unemployment, depending on the country. Data
come fromWorldBank (2015).
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ther, our theoretical concept is broader than just job loss. While losing one’s job should
be tied to one’s financial situation, it is not the only event through which economic crises
affect one’s financial situations. Our previous analyses show this has some important
influences on the results when compared to those when we use a variable that captures
a broader financial household situation. In Table 1, we see that the negative reactions
when the financial household situation “got worse” are stronger than when the personal
job situation does.17 Therefore, we should expect more muted responses.
[TABLE 2 HERE]
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 2. Our evidence is largely consistent
with the previous results, although not perfectly so. Our 2011 estimates for respondents
with crisis-induced job loss are comparable with those from our main analysis in Table 1:
they are robustly negative and on a roughly similar magnitude, as judged by the coeffi-
cient size of the “got worse” estimates. The 2009 estimates provide mixed support. On
the question about Is aid important?, the median estimate is small and negative, and the
95% central credible interval spans zero. For the Keep promise? response, themedian effect
is again negative as expected, but the upper bound of the 95% credible interval touches
zero (when rounding using three digits behind the decimal point). While we would ex-
pect weaker reactions on the Is aid important? question, the small, negative effect together
with the credible interval covering zero is not expected. However, taken together, it is
reassuring as a whole that the results are broadly pointing in the right direction, despite
the caveats we raised earlier.
6 United Kingdom’s “ring-fencing”
So far, we have shown that downturns in people’s personal fortunes lead to considerably
less support for foreign aid, and that similar effects broadly hold if we restrict attention
17 The difference is indistinguishable for the Is aid important? question.
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to self-reported crisis-induced job loss. We argued that politicians in democratic donors
tend to react to such changes in voters’ attitudes, highlighting the role of public opinion
in how aid decisions are made during economic crises.
In the recent financial and Eurozone crises, one case stands prominently apart from
the others, as well as with respect to our arguments. The case of the United Kingdom
has politicians taking a deliberate step to “ring-fence” foreign aid—i.e. to exempt it from
considerations to cut it, which seems to be at odds with the arguments we develop here.18
Despite some evidence that a majority of Britons did not support such ring-fencing of for-
eign aid,19 during the 2010 general election campaign, politicians from the United King-
dom’s major parties took a consolidated stance on protecting foreign aid from seemingly
inevitable budget cuts, and publicly supported meeting Britain’s commitment to spend
0.7% of GDP on international development by 2013. The parties emphasized the moral
duty of helping the world’s poor as well as the ability of aid to contribute to Britain’s
security by creating more stable and effective states.20
After the election, foreign aid was protected under the coalition government formed
between the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats. Although some members of the
Conservative party challenged the government’s decision to protect aid,21 PrimeMinister
David Cameron remained committed to meeting the 0.7% spending target,22 and both
Cameron and AndrewMitchell, Secretary of State for International Development, framed
the decision to protect the aid budget as a moral one and one that was in the British
18 We thank a reviewer for putting this into the context of our article.
19 Mark Tran, “Britons think development aid for poor countries is wasted,” The Guardian, URL: http:
//bit.ly/1F1gIB6, September 8, 2010.
20 See Department for International Development, “Eliminating World Poverty: Building our Common
Future,” URL: http://bit.ly/1Fdk0TX, 2009; Policy Green Paper No. 11, “One World Conservatism:
A Conservative Agenda for International Development,” URL: http://betterfutu.re/1PomZ45,
2009.
21 Press Association, “Liam Fox challenges Camerons overseas aid pledge,” The Guardian, URL: http:
//bit.ly/1PonkUn, May 17, 2011.
22 Press Association, “Overseas aid targets ‘will be made law’, insists government,” The Guardian, URL:
http://bit.ly/1cEkTLw, May 17, 2011.
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national interest.23
The case garnered so much attention precisely because it seems to be quite an aberra-
tion. In other countries like the United States, politicians fought hard to cut foreign aid.
Nevertheless, this case highlights the active role that politicians played in the aid debates,
indicating the possible influence of elite opinions on public attitudes toward aid. In fact,
the effects of elite messages on voters’ attitudes toward policies have long been the sub-
ject of debate in political science. As we have argued above, people are not experts on
foreign aid and should thus form their opinions using cues from the media, politicians,
celebrities, and other elites (Zaller 1990, Zaller & Feldman 1992, Zaller 1992, Lodge, Steen-
bergen & Brau 1995, Baum 2002, Baum & Jamison 2006). The British case is remarkable
in that elites actually agreed on the “ring-fencing” idea, so that the average citizen was
bound to predominantly hear messages against cutting aid. From this perspective, the
British case allows us to address whether such elite messaging can weaken the reaction
of citizens when their financial situation “got worse.”24
Before introducing how we assess this possibility, some words of caution are war-
ranted. Although political scientists are generally in agreement about messaging effects
(often as shown in research labs), it is difficult to show credible evidence from observa-
tional data (e.g. Bartels 1993, Gabel & Scheve 2007). For example, research in American
politics has struggled to find convincing evidence for causal effects of political campaigns
due to omitted variable bias, which stems from elites and citizens responding to the same
23 David Cameron, “David Cameron: Why we’re right to ringfence the aid budget,” The Guardian, URL:
http://bit.ly/1KSnDA9, June 11, 2011; Larry Elliot, “Andrew Mitchell defends higher British spend-
ing on aid as a moral duty,” The Guardian, URL: http://bit.ly/1e5K7TX, June 8, 2011.
24 It is worth noting that in a recent article, using data from the U.K. Public Opinion Monitor, Henson &
Lindstrom (2013) report a finding that changes in individuals’ financial circumstances have no influ-
ence on their support for foreign aid. While this finding is consistent with the claim that elite messag-
ing weakened individuals’ negative reaction to foreign aid due to their financial circumstances, their
evidence needs to be interpreted with caution. In particular, their results suffer from a post-treatment
bias as they include a number of individuals’ views and attitudes toward aid and development, which
are likely due to the consequences of one’s financial changes. Conditioning on such variables obscures
the causal effects of individuals’ financial situations in ways that are difficult to assess a priori (King &
Zeng 2006).
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unobserved stimulus, and an endogeneity problem caused by elites’ strategic considera-
tions (elites anticipate the public’s reaction, and thus make certain claims).
With these caveats in mind, we try to locate such messaging effects in our survey data.
We are guided by the idea that if British elites influenced public support for aid, survey
responses in Britain should be different from those in the rest of the countries in our data,
particularly when such respondents’ personal situations “got worse.” This is not a perfect
test; however, we believe that a comparison of the British case to others is justified given
how unique the British case was. To this end, we reestimated the models in ourHousehold
specifications from Table 1 while allowing not only the intercept to vary by country, but
also letting each country have its own coefficients on the levels of financial situation of
the household.25 This thus constitutes a random-intercept, random-slope ordered probit
(Gelman & Hill 2006). Such country-specific random slopes let us see whether Britons’
reactions when the personal situation “got worse” is different from the reactions by each
of the other countries in our sample.26
If elite messaging is effective and it most prominently and strongly occurred in the
United Kingdom, then the British survey-takers’ reaction should be among the weakest.
That is, we expect the least negative slopes on the “got worse” response for the United
Kingdom. Since we estimate the parameters via MCMC, we obtain a full distribution
of such slope estimates for each country. To get an estimate of how different the British
slope is compared to all the others’, we rank-order the sizes of all 27 random slopes at
every iteration of the MCMC in terms of how close the slopes are to zero, and then save
the United Kingdom’s ranks. Ranking is advantageous because of their natural interpre-
tation. If the story about elite messaging is correct, we should see the ranks for the United
25 Since the “ring-fencing” idea did not become adopted until 2010, we dropped EB71.2 (2009) from this
sample. Other than that, this analysis is the same the ones we reported in columns one, three, and five
in Table 1.
26 The coefficient estimates are presented in Section B. Based on the results, the estimated slopes for
the U.K. are negative across the three dependent variables: −0.17(−0.29,−0.05) for Is aid important?,
−0.22(−0.32,−0.11) for Keep promise?, and −0.24(−0.36,−0.1) for Pay more?.
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Kingdom to be among the top ranks.
Consider first the upper panel in Figure 2. Under each of our three models, we calcu-
lated the posterior probability27 of the United Kingdom’s random slope for “got worse”
taking on each rank. For the Is aid important? graph, the possible ranks are along the
x-axis, and the y-axis shows the posterior probability for each rank. On the question of
whether aid is important, the British reaction is among the bottom third. That is, a Brit
that says that the financial situation in the household “got worse” reacts more strongly
and more negatively than about three-fourths of the rest of the Europeans. This is at
odds with the idea that the messaging by British politicians dampened the reaction to a
worsening of the personal situation.
[FIGURE 2 HERE]
Looking now at the posterior probabilities for the British ranks for the Keep promise?
and Pay more? dependent variables, Britain is moving up. It occupies the middle ranks
for the former, and its modal estimate is the fifth rank for the latter. While this is different
from the previous estimate, the responses by the British are remarkably ordinary overall.
In the bottom panel, we considered the British random slope only among the top five
EU donors and their slopes (Britain, Germany, France, Sweden, andNetherlands). The re-
sult mirrors those from the other analysis: British citizens, despite the unified messaging
by elites, react quite like the average top five donors’ citizens to their worsened personal
circumstances.
Taken together, we see little obvious evidence that British citizens reacted very dif-
ferently from the rest of Europeans. We take this as suggestive that that British politi-
cians’ stance on protecting aid from cuts had little influence on public opinion. Further-
more, this evidence provides an interesting question for future research: why did the
U.K. politicians unite to protect aid despite the fact that it was electorally costly? In the
27 The posterior probability is simply the number of MCMC draws that had a particular rank divided by
the total number of iterations.
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conclusion, we also draw some implications from this evidence for how aid advocates
may prevent aid cuts during economic recessions.
7 Conclusion
The recent financial crises have led to concerns about donors’ willingness to give aid.
While we know empirically that aid flows are sensitive to economic crises in donor coun-
tries, prior research has rarely gone beyond the empirics. In this paper, we drew on
insights from several bodies of study and developed a causal mechanism behind the eco-
nomic crisis-aid nexus by focusing on public opinion as a source of aid cuts. We argued
that foreign aid becomes unpopular and an easy target for politicians because voters tend
to believe foreign aid is a form of charity and overestimate current aid levels. The results
from our analysis of Eurobarometer data consistently support the hypothesis that indi-
vidual pessimistic perceptions of the economy lead to less support for helping the poor
abroad. Moreover, the evidence suggests that the implied costliness of providing support
matters. For example, when asked about support for helping the poor in principle, we
find that respondents withdraw their support less than when asked about EU aid or their
willingness to pay out of their own pockets.
Our study provides several implications for how to prevent donor countries from cut-
ting aid commitments. First, evidence that voters care about the costliness of aid policies
implies that multilateral aid may be less sensitive to economic crises because voters seem
to see such aid as less costly. This suggests that one effective way to prevent aid cuts may
be to encourage sending aid through international financial institutions and multilateral
development agencies.
Second, our findings suggest that the key to preventing aid cuts is voters, but exactly
how to stop their negative reactions to aid giving during economic crises still needs to
be uncovered. Our central finding suggests that voters within donors play an important
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role. It would thus be tempting to conclude that aid practitioners and international or-
ganizations should target their efforts on voters during economic crises. However, the
British case (weakly) suggests that politicians’ stances on protecting aid did not have a
noticeable effect on citizens’ reactions to the crisis. While we should not draw hasty con-
clusions from this finding, partly because it is difficult to determine the causal effect of
elite messaging using purely observational data, the British case brings into question the
ability of elite messaging to change voters’ attitudes toward aid.
This does not necessarily suggest that any type of messages will be effective, however.
One important avenue for future research is to investigate the efficacy of different types of
messages. Previous experimental studies on the efficiency of different messages at getting
people to donate to charities can provide a starting point for research on aidmessages and
public opinion. These studies have found that certain types ofmessages and strategies are
more likely to increase charitable giving than others (Fetherstonhaugh, Slovic, Johnson &
Friedrich 1997, Small & Loewenstein 2003, Slovic 2007, Small, Loewenstein & Slovic 2007).
Similarly, in political science, studies have investigated the effectiveness of various get-
out-the-vote campaigns (e.g. Gerber & Green 2000) using field experiments. Drawing on
insights from these bodies of literature, future studies should look at different aspects of
messages and how they can affect voters’ opinions on aid cuts during economic crises.
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Table 1: Support for foreign aid. EB79.4 (2013), EB77.4 (2012), EB73.5 (2010), and EB71.2 (2009) are used for
the first four models; EB79.4 (2013), EB77.4 (2012), and EB71.2 (2009) for the last two models. 95% central
credible intervals are presented in parentheses. Another cutpoint is at zero by design.
Is aid important? Keep promise? Pay more?
Household Job Household Job Household Job
Financial situation
Got worse -0.115 -0.132 -0.215 -0.112 -0.325 -0.206
(-0.139, -0.093) (-0.156, -0.107) (-0.238, -0.192) (-0.137, -0.088) (-0.361, -0.288) (-0.245, -0.168)
Improved 0.104 0.14 0.087 0.14 0.15 0.184
(0.074, 0.135) (0.109, 0.17) (0.057, 0.117) (0.11, 0.17) (0.105, 0.194) (0.14, 0.229)
DK -0.094 -0.076 -0.102 -0.045 -0.203 -0.13
(-0.187, -0.001) (-0.166, 0.015) (-0.195, -0.006) (-0.14, 0.051) (-0.352, -0.056) (-0.276, 0.015)
Gender: female 0.175 0.17 0.012 0.006 0.031 0.021
(0.155, 0.195) (0.151, 0.19) (-0.008, 0.032) (-0.014, 0.025) (0, 0.061) (-0.008, 0.052)
Age: 25-34 -0.074 -0.066 -0.111 -0.108 0.011 0.018
(-0.122, -0.026) (-0.113, -0.018) (-0.157, -0.063) (-0.154, -0.06) (-0.062, 0.085) (-0.055, 0.09)
Age: 35-44 -0.131 -0.12 -0.146 -0.145 0.007 0.007
(-0.179, -0.083) (-0.169, -0.072) (-0.193, -0.098) (-0.193, -0.097) (-0.068, 0.083) (-0.068, 0.081)
Age: 45-54 -0.162 -0.149 -0.188 -0.186 -0.012 -0.011
(-0.21, -0.113) (-0.198, -0.101) (-0.236, -0.14) (-0.234, -0.137) (-0.087, 0.063) (-0.086, 0.065)
Age: 55-64 -0.132 -0.121 -0.17 -0.168 -0.009 -0.011
(-0.183, -0.081) (-0.173, -0.07) (-0.221, -0.119) (-0.219, -0.119) (-0.088, 0.07) (-0.093, 0.068)
Age: 65+ -0.196 -0.191 -0.249 -0.242 -0.159 -0.159
(-0.253, -0.139) (-0.248, -0.134) (-0.305, -0.194) (-0.297, -0.184) (-0.247, -0.071) (-0.248, -0.071)
SR: top of bottom 0.097 0.1 0.14 0.152 0.314 0.331
(0.042, 0.151) (0.046, 0.156) (0.083, 0.195) (0.096, 0.209) (0.209, 0.416) (0.229, 0.435)
SR: middle 0.196 0.207 0.251 0.288 0.591 0.64
(0.143, 0.249) (0.153, 0.26) (0.195, 0.305) (0.232, 0.342) (0.49, 0.691) (0.543, 0.742)
SR: bottom of top 0.291 0.306 0.355 0.405 0.772 0.842
(0.234, 0.348) (0.25, 0.363) (0.296, 0.412) (0.348, 0.463) (0.667, 0.875) (0.738, 0.945)
SR: top of top 0.327 0.341 0.413 0.464 0.796 0.859
(0.24, 0.414) (0.254, 0.429) (0.327, 0.5) (0.379, 0.55) (0.658, 0.934) (0.721, 0.998)
SR: DK/ refused 0.153 0.161 0.133 0.168 0.461 0.508
(0.074, 0.231) (0.083, 0.239) (0.052, 0.213) (0.085, 0.248) (0.323, 0.6) (0.372, 0.646)
Living: large town 0.136 0.136 0.276 0.278 -0.191 -0.208
(-0.159, 0.42) (-0.153, 0.421) (-0.012, 0.564) (-0.005, 0.565) (-0.718, 0.351) (-0.735, 0.337)
Living: rural area/village 0.026 0.027 0.148 0.155 -0.356 -0.367
(-0.27, 0.309) (-0.261, 0.313) (-0.139, 0.435) (-0.127, 0.443) (-0.886, 0.186) (-0.892, 0.176)
Living: small/ middle town 0.085 0.087 0.201 0.206 -0.278 -0.29
(-0.209, 0.368) (-0.201, 0.374) (-0.087, 0.488) (-0.076, 0.495) (-0.806, 0.261) (-0.816, 0.254)
Job: employed position 0.109 0.103 0.093 0.09 -0.034 -0.041
(0.058, 0.16) (0.053, 0.154) (0.043, 0.143) (0.04, 0.141) (-0.108, 0.041) (-0.117, 0.035)
Job: management 0.306 0.299 0.272 0.274 0.224 0.225
(0.247, 0.364) (0.241, 0.357) (0.215, 0.328) (0.217, 0.331) (0.139, 0.309) (0.14, 0.311)
Job: professional 0.34 0.333 0.286 0.285 0.353 0.351
(0.271, 0.406) (0.265, 0.398) (0.22, 0.351) (0.22, 0.351) (0.257, 0.45) (0.254, 0.447)
Job: retiree 0.076 0.065 0.03 0.012 -0.179 -0.212
(0.02, 0.133) (0.009, 0.12) (-0.025, 0.085) (-0.045, 0.067) (-0.262, -0.095) (-0.296, -0.127)
Job: student 0.345 0.34 0.298 0.296 0.253 0.23
(0.277, 0.414) (0.271, 0.409) (0.23, 0.366) (0.228, 0.364) (0.15, 0.354) (0.125, 0.335)
Job: unemployed 0.071 0.095 0.002 -0.002 -0.28 -0.284
(0.013, 0.129) (0.037, 0.152) (-0.054, 0.06) (-0.06, 0.056) (-0.367, -0.192) (-0.371, -0.194)
Job: other 0.012 0.009 0.014 0.009 -0.329 -0.342
(-0.038, 0.063) (-0.04, 0.06) (-0.035, 0.064) (-0.042, 0.059) (-0.404, -0.252) (-0.417, -0.266)
Year: 2010 0.223 0.222 -0.481 -0.484
(0.196, 0.251) (0.195, 0.249) (-0.509, -0.453) (-0.512, -0.457)
Year: 2012 -0.109 -0.111 -0.663 -0.67
(-0.136, -0.081) (-0.138, -0.083) (-0.691, -0.635) (-0.697, -0.642)
Year: 2013 -0.337 -0.339 -0.657 -0.662 0.141 0.143
(-0.364, -0.31) (-0.366, -0.311) (-0.684, -0.629) (-0.69, -0.634) (0.111, 0.17) (0.114, 0.173)
Intercept 2.524 2.498 1.52 1.425 -0.358 -0.459
(2.198, 2.86) (2.171, 2.822) (1.199, 1.838) (1.107, 1.739) (-0.971, 0.245) (-1.079, 0.148)
Cutpoint 1 1.107 1.107 0.735 0.734 1.665 1.659
(1.087, 1.127) (1.088, 1.127) (0.725, 0.746) (0.723, 0.745) (1.642, 1.687) (1.636, 1.682)
Cutpoint 2 3.278 3.278 2.941 2.936 2.766 2.758
(3.254, 3.301) (3.256, 3.302) (2.923, 2.958) (2.918, 2.955) (2.731, 2.801) (2.723, 2.793)
Var: intercept 0.132 0.132 0.073 0.073 0.398 0.416
(0.079, 0.242) (0.079, 0.238) (0.044, 0.135) (0.044, 0.134) (0.24, 0.736) (0.25, 0.758)
Observations 105538 105538 105538 105538 52694 52694
Countries 27 27 27 27 27 27
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Figure 1: Probability for levels of support by change in financial household situation.. Each dot de-
notes the median posterior estimate, and the vertical lines the 95% central credible interval. Grey dots and
lines denote the probabilities when the financial situation “got worse”, and the black counterparts when it
“improved.”
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Table 2: Support for foreign aid when crisis led to job loss. EB76.1 (2011) and EB71.2 (2009) are used.
95% credible intervals are presented in parentheses. Another cutpoint is at zero by design. (a) and (b)
distinguish the slightly different wording and response options in the questions.
Is aid important? Keep promise? Pay more?
2009 2011 2009 2011 2011
Job loss
Due to crisis (a) -0.017 -0.081
(-0.098, 0.064) (-0.162, 0)
Due to crisis (b) -0.066 -0.118 -0.216
(-0.13, -0.004) (-0.18, -0.056) (-0.287, -0.146)
DK/ refused 0.024 -0.053 -0.159
(-0.034, 0.082) (-0.11, 0.004) (-0.22, -0.096)
Gender: female 0.207 0.136 0.036 0.05 -0.011
(0.167, 0.248) (0.097, 0.176) (-0.005, 0.076) (0.011, 0.09) (-0.053, 0.031)
Age: 25-34 -0.156 -0.067 -0.158 -0.136 0.027
(-0.25, -0.064) (-0.163, 0.029) (-0.251, -0.064) (-0.23, -0.042) (-0.076, 0.128)
Age: 35-44 -0.217 -0.061 -0.208 -0.2 -0.014
(-0.312, -0.123) (-0.158, 0.035) (-0.304, -0.112) (-0.293, -0.104) (-0.116, 0.09)
Age: 45-54 -0.247 -0.055 -0.204 -0.214 -0.01
(-0.341, -0.15) (-0.151, 0.041) (-0.3, -0.108) (-0.309, -0.119) (-0.114, 0.095)
Age: 55-64 -0.2 -0.062 -0.209 -0.234 -0.052
(-0.299, -0.101) (-0.162, 0.038) (-0.308, -0.109) (-0.332, -0.135) (-0.159, 0.055)
Age: 65+ -0.254 -0.093 -0.259 -0.279 -0.212
(-0.364, -0.144) (-0.203, 0.019) (-0.373, -0.146) (-0.387, -0.167) (-0.332, -0.092)
SR: top of bottom 0.032 0.15 0.141 0.254 0.364
(-0.075, 0.139) (0.041, 0.261) (0.026, 0.255) (0.144, 0.364) (0.23, 0.5)
SR: middle 0.144 0.212 0.239 0.317 0.63
(0.041, 0.246) (0.105, 0.32) (0.129, 0.348) (0.209, 0.426) (0.499, 0.762)
SR: bottom of top 0.248 0.26 0.328 0.406 0.811
(0.139, 0.357) (0.146, 0.376) (0.213, 0.444) (0.291, 0.522) (0.674, 0.949)
SR: top of top 0.294 0.255 0.355 0.314 0.736
(0.123, 0.464) (0.083, 0.426) (0.181, 0.528) (0.144, 0.485) (0.548, 0.922)
SR: DK/ refused 0.127 0.096 0.231 0.195 0.44
(-0.019, 0.27) (-0.06, 0.252) (0.076, 0.388) (0.037, 0.356) (0.261, 0.622)
Living: large town 0.07 0.471 0.096 0.143 0.59
(-0.41, 0.536) (-0.186, 1.118) (-0.369, 0.568) (-0.507, 0.798) (-0.23, 1.453)
Living: rural area/village -0.036 0.342 -0.046 -0.014 0.516
(-0.516, 0.431) (-0.312, 0.99) (-0.509, 0.425) (-0.662, 0.638) (-0.304, 1.381)
Living: small/ middle town 0.049 0.356 0.004 -0.007 0.476
(-0.433, 0.514) (-0.299, 1.001) (-0.461, 0.472) (-0.655, 0.647) (-0.346, 1.334)
Job: employed position 0.091 0.063 0.043 0.098 -0.085
(-0.011, 0.191) (-0.04, 0.166) (-0.059, 0.144) (-0.005, 0.201) (-0.192, 0.022)
Job: management 0.38 0.323 0.277 0.355 0.362
(0.266, 0.498) (0.203, 0.44) (0.163, 0.393) (0.24, 0.472) (0.244, 0.48)
Job: professional 0.422 0.316 0.258 0.286 0.438
(0.288, 0.554) (0.18, 0.453) (0.122, 0.389) (0.15, 0.42) (0.301, 0.575)
Job: retiree 0.04 0.008 -0.106 0.023 -0.142
(-0.072, 0.151) (-0.106, 0.12) (-0.219, 0.005) (-0.088, 0.136) (-0.26, -0.025)
Job: student 0.324 0.312 0.149 0.239 0.27
(0.187, 0.46) (0.174, 0.451) (0.014, 0.286) (0.1, 0.377) (0.125, 0.413)
Job: unemployed 0.032 0.043 -0.109 0.03 -0.285
(-0.092, 0.156) (-0.075, 0.161) (-0.233, 0.017) (-0.089, 0.148) (-0.411, -0.159)
Job: other -0.038 -0.096 -0.062 -0.011 -0.367
(-0.138, 0.06) (-0.198, 0.005) (-0.165, 0.038) (-0.113, 0.091) (-0.477, -0.26)
Intercept 2.734 2.053 1.569 0.994 -1.033
(2.228, 3.251) (1.361, 2.748) (1.051, 2.089) (0.321, 1.665) (-1.95, -0.17)
Cutpoint 1 1.132 1.047 0.516 0.733 1.679
(1.089, 1.177) (1.01, 1.084) (0.496, 0.536) (0.713, 0.754) (1.648, 1.71)
Cutpoint 2 3.358 3.207 2.66 3.048 2.801
(3.309, 3.408) (3.163, 3.253) (2.626, 2.694) (3.012, 3.085) (2.753, 2.849)
Var: intercept 0.122 0.244 0.167 0.121 0.406
(0.072, 0.226) (0.146, 0.447) (0.1, 0.309) (0.072, 0.223) (0.246, 0.749)
Observations 26454 26549 26454 26549 26549
Countries 27 27 27 27 27
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Figure 2: Probabilities for ranks of U.K. random slopes. Using full distributions of random slopes for all
countries (upper panel) and only the top five donors (bottom panel), we calculate ranks of the U.K. random
slopes from the smallest to the largest. Along the x-axis are the possible ranks, and the y-axis depicts the
posterior probability that each rank is realized.
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A Survey: Question wordings
Is aid Important? The question is, “In your opinion, is it very important, fairly impor-
tant, not very important or not at all important to help people in developing coun-
tries?”. The response options are “Very important”, “Fairly important”, “Not very
important,” “Not at all important,” and “Don’t know.”
Keep promise? The verbiage is, “The European Union has promised to increase the level
of its aid towards developing countries. Given the current economic situation,
which of the following propositions best describes your opinion?” The options are
“We should increase European aid to developing countries beyond what is already
promised,” “We should keep our promise to developing countries,” “We should not
increase the levels of aid to developing countries even though it has been promised,”
“We should reduce aid to developing countries as we can no longer afford it,” and
“Don’t know.”
Pay more? The question is, “Would you be prepared to pay more for groceries or other
products from developing countries to support people living in these countries (for
instance for fair trade products)?” Respondents could choose whether they were
“not ready to pay more,” “be ready to pay up to five percent more,” “be ready to
pay six to ten percent more,” “be ready to pay more than ten percent more,” or
“don’t know.”
Financial situation In the surveys, respondents were asked, “compared with five years
ago, would you say things have improved, gotten worse or stayed about the same”
with respect to several areas. We focus on personal changes; specifically, we use
questions about changes in the respondents’ the “financial situation in your house-
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hold” and “personal job situation.” The possible answers include “Improved,” “Got
worse,” “Stayed about the same,” and “Don’t know.”
Job Loss In EB76.1 (2011), respondents were asked, “Here are some situations that could
have arisen recently in your working life or in the working life of those around you.
For each of them, please tell me if this has happened as a direct consequence of the
crisis, if it has happened but was not a direct consequence of the crisis, or if it has
not happened at all.” One situation was “You have lost your job [or] your partner
(husband or wife, partner, etc.) has lost his [or] her job.” The response options were
“Yes, as a direct consequence of the crisis”, “Yes but not as a direct consequence of
the crisis”, “No, it has not happened at all,” or “Don’t know.” In EB71.2 (2009), one
question asked “Please tell me whether or not each of the following situations has
happened to you, as a result of the economic crisis.” One situation was “You lost
your job.” The possible answers were “Yes” or “No.”
Age The possible levels are: 15-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, and 65+.
Gender The variable takes on “male” and “female.”
Social rank The question is: “on the following scale, step ’1’ corresponds to ”the lowest
level in the society”; step ’10’ corresponds to ‘the highest level in the society’. Could
you tell me on which step you would place yourself?” We coarsened the responses
into group one and two “bottom of bottom”, three and four as “top of bottom”, five
and six as “middle”, seven and eight as “bottom of top”, and nine and ten as “top
of top.” We also code a dummy for don’t-know and missing responses.
Living The question is, “Would you say you live in a ...?”, which has the following possi-
ble answers: “rural area of small village”, “small or middle sized town”, and “large
town.” Don’t-know and missing responses are coded separately.
Job The question asked, “Did you do any paid work in the past? What was your last oc-
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cupation?”We used the responses listed under “current occupation”, coarsening re-
sponses somewhat. We are using the following levels: “employed position,” “man-
agement,” “professional,” “retiree,” “student,” “unemployed,” and then “other”.
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B Regression Table: Random-slope Ordered Probit
Table 3: Support for foreign aid, random effects model. The Household variable was used to measure
the personal financial situation. EB79.4 (2013), EB77.4 (2012), and EB73.5 (2010) are used for the first two
models; EB79.4 (2013) and EB77.4 (2012) for the last model. 95% central credible intervals are presented in
parentheses. Another cutpoint is at zero by design.
Is aid important? Keep promise? Pay more?
Financial situation (Household)
Got worse -0.125 -0.212 -0.324
(-0.19, -0.06) (-0.264, -0.16) (-0.385, -0.265)
Improved 0.105 0.092 0.183
(0.034, 0.179) (0.028, 0.159) (0.09, 0.278)
DK -0.1 -0.093 -0.184
(-0.233, 0.03) (-0.225, 0.038) (-0.347, -0.012)
Gender: female 0.162 0.001 0.03
(0.14, 0.185) (-0.022, 0.023) (0.001, 0.06)
Age: 25-34 -0.042 -0.101 0.01
(-0.098, 0.014) (-0.156, -0.045) (-0.063, 0.085)
Age: 35-44 -0.104 -0.136 0.008
(-0.16, -0.046) (-0.193, -0.08) (-0.066, 0.086)
Age: 45-54 -0.139 -0.205 -0.01
(-0.196, -0.082) (-0.261, -0.149) (-0.086, 0.066)
Age: 55-64 -0.12 -0.181 -0.008
(-0.179, -0.061) (-0.24, -0.122) (-0.086, 0.073)
Age: 65+ -0.19 -0.269 -0.159
(-0.256, -0.122) (-0.334, -0.203) (-0.247, -0.069)
SR: top of bottom 0.125 0.158 0.313
(0.06, 0.19) (0.094, 0.223) (0.21, 0.416)
SR: middle 0.221 0.279 0.581
(0.158, 0.282) (0.216, 0.343) (0.482, 0.682)
SR: bottom of top 0.313 0.386 0.761
(0.245, 0.378) (0.319, 0.454) (0.658, 0.866)
SR: top of top 0.346 0.449 0.775
(0.245, 0.448) (0.351, 0.549) (0.635, 0.916)
SR: DK/ refused 0.16 0.106 0.452
(0.066, 0.254) (0.014, 0.202) (0.317, 0.589)
Living: large town 0.215 0.343 -0.196
(-0.157, 0.584) (-0.023, 0.709) (-0.727, 0.343)
Living: rural area/village 0.101 0.223 -0.361
(-0.267, 0.47) (-0.142, 0.589) (-0.891, 0.178)
Living: small/ middle town 0.15 0.261 -0.284
(-0.217, 0.521) (-0.104, 0.628) (-0.813, 0.258)
Job: employed position 0.119 0.11 -0.027
(0.059, 0.18) (0.053, 0.168) (-0.105, 0.048)
Job: management 0.288 0.285 0.233
(0.22, 0.355) (0.22, 0.352) (0.147, 0.319)
Job: professional 0.32 0.306 0.359
(0.242, 0.398) (0.229, 0.381) (0.26, 0.457)
Job: retiree 0.082 0.065 -0.179
(0.017, 0.148) (0.001, 0.13) (-0.262, -0.095)
Job: student 0.35 0.338 0.254
(0.269, 0.432) (0.261, 0.418) (0.148, 0.357)
Job: unemployed 0.076 0.039 -0.278
(0.01, 0.144) (-0.026, 0.106) (-0.368, -0.19)
Job: other 0.024 0.029 -0.326
(-0.035, 0.083) (-0.028, 0.088) (-0.403, -0.25)
Year: 2012 -0.333 -0.186
(-0.361, -0.306) (-0.214, -0.159)
Year: 2013 -0.558 -0.178 0.14
(-0.586, -0.53) (-0.206, -0.151) (0.11, 0.169)
Intercept 2.629 0.983 -0.346
(2.218, 3.041) (0.586, 1.374) (-0.959, 0.261)
Cutpoint 1 1.107 0.795 1.666
(1.084, 1.129) (0.782, 0.807) (1.643, 1.688)
Cutpoint 2 3.269 3.044 2.767
(3.242, 3.296) (3.023, 3.064) (2.732, 2.802)
Var: intercept 0.183 0.089 0.473
(0.106, 0.356) (0.051, 0.171) (0.278, 0.909)
Var: coefficient on ’Got Worse’ 0.022 0.012 0.014
(0.011, 0.046) (0.005, 0.028) (0.004, 0.038)
Var: coefficient on ’Improved’ 0.024 0.018 0.04
(0.01, 0.056) (0.007, 0.043) (0.017, 0.092)
Var: coefficient on ’DK’ 0.026 0.021 0.022
(0.003, 0.108) (0.002, 0.098) (0.002, 0.117)
Observations 79084 79084 52694
Countries 27 27 27
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C Summary Statistics
Table 4: Summary statistics. Proportions are based on all Eurobarometer waves. Missing values are omit-
ted from calculations.
Variable Proportion Proportion
Age
15-24 0.12 25-34 0.15
35-44 0.17 45-54 0.17
55-64 0.17 65+ 0.23
Household situation
Got worse 0.41 Improved 0.16
Stayed the same 0.42 Don’t know 0.01
Job situation
Got worse 0.27 Improved 0.15
Stayed the same 0.47 Don’t know 0.11
Job loss in crisis (a)
Yes 0.09 No 0.91
Job loss in crisis (b)
Yes 0.16 No 0.76
Yes, but not crisis 0.08
Is aid important?
Not at all 0.03 Not very 0.1
Fairly 0.5 Very 0.36
Keep promise?
Reduce aid 0.18 Not increase 0.16
Keep promise 0.52 Increase 0.14
Pay more?
Not more 0.55 Up to 5% more 0.32
6-10% more 0.09 More than 10% 0.03
Gender
Male 0.46 Female 0.54
Living
Large town 0.28 Small/ middle town 0.37
Rural area 0.35 Don’t know 0
Social rank
Top of top 0.02 Bottom of top 0.23
Middle 0.48 Top of bottom 0.21
Bottom of bottom 0.04 Don’t know/ refused 0.03
Job
Business owner 0.05 Employed position 0.18
Management 0.07 Other 0.21
Professional 0.04 Retiree/ unable to work 0.29
Student 0.08 Unemployed 0.09
Year
2009 0.2 2010 0.2
2011 0.2 2012 0.2
2013 0.2
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